Introduction
Professor Bianchi, Professor Lalive, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, friends.
I deeply honored by the invitation of the Lalive firm and the Graduate
Institute to give this year's lecture. The Graduate Institute in my estimation possesses the finest faculty of international law, politics, history and economics.
In this series, its unique place in academia is partnered with very best of legal practice, the Lalive firm. Over my career I have had the pleasure of knowing several members of that firm --Michael Schnieder, Teresa Giovannini, Viejo Hessikanen to name a few. All are fantastic lawyers: ethical, skilled, and a pleasure to be around. I suppose this is to be expected of Lalive lawyers. As the students here today likely feel --as we grow into the field of international law, there are persons who occupy a place beyond all others. For me, Professor
Lalive was, and is, such a giant. To be here today with him is a distinct pleasure and honor.
It likewise is a pleasure to return to Geneva, I spent a fantastic seven years commuting here (by fantastic, I refer to being here, not the commuting) working with the United Nations Compensation Comission, as did many others present today. It is a gracious city, a beautiful city and for me, a city that inspires and calls to all that I feel is best in me.
Let me add that I am particularly delighted to be in a city where there resides one of the largest concentrations of members of the American Society of International Law outside of the United States. As I hope my talk conveys tonight, it is my firm belief that we as international lawyers share not only the language of law, but also a vision of global order under law and with justice.
ASIL attempts to involve, and support the work of, our sister societies around the world, and it deeply appreciates the support of our members wherever they are found.
Finally, before I start I must tell you that although my parents are from Quebec, they did not teach me French and I regret I have not learned it on my own. But given that I was a mischievous child, I did learn several colorful rude French words as they tried to civilize me. I particularly recall a note of frustration in their voices as they referred to me as "un petite cochon."
[Thesis, Structure of the Talk] I find tonight's task daunting because of the double challenge of first addressing the theme of this lecture series -namely the interface of public and private international law, and second to be, as is appropriate with a lecture such as this, insightful, provocative and entertaining. So tonight, as befits the scope of inquiry at the Graduate Institute, I attempt to step back and reflect on the big picture, and in particular to look from the perspective of the task of international courts and tribunals at the structure of emerging global governance. And let me emphasize that I said global governance, I did not use the term global government. Indeed, a major belief that pervades my talk tonight is that the nation state is not withering away, but rather will remain as the primary instrument through which all efforts at global governance will be attempted. I do not say this simply as an acknowledgement of reality, but also as a desirable outcome. We should not seek the end of the nation state, but rather we should strive for its transformation into a responsible agent of coordinated global governance. International Community" where he argued in response to this problematique, among other things, that international courts not only gave a decision in a particular court, but that they also were fundamental to making international law a more complete and effective law. properly in accordance with the Convention, the Authority may require the assistance of an independent and impartial judicial body. This is the underlying reason for the advisory jurisdiction of the Chamber. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, the Chamber is part of the system in which the Authority's organs operate, but its task within that system is to act as an independent and impartial body. My objection to these paragraphs is not to the high-minded propositions they express. Instead, I consider that they deal with matters the Court has no jurisdiction to address once it has ruled that it lacks prima facie jurisdiction to issue the requested provisional measures.
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He goes on the Court's own "responsibilities in the maintenance of peace and security under the Charter" are not general. They are strictly limited to the exercise of its judicial functions in cases over which it has jurisdiction.
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In other words, faithful adherence to the direct function suggests that the Court not gratuitously say things that it believes advances the consequential function. The consequentialist function is not the court's direct function.
Why did the Court say more than it needed to? Did it feel a responsibility beyond its direct function of deciding the case in front of it.
Judge Koroma, for example, also agreed with the denial of the request, but regarding these same paragraphs, he expressed the opinion that the Court had through the obiter dicta in the paragraphs discharged its responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security and preventing the aggravation of the dispute.
[2nd Preliminary Point -The Nail and the Screwdriver]
This discussion of courts and the use of force leads to my second preliminary point. And I will call this my nail and screwdriver point That is, the old story is of the man who has a nail to drive, but has only a screwdriver and thus proceeds to use the wrong tool for the task. In considering judicial function, we must carefully consider the range of institutions that were available to fulfill a consequentialist function. My point is that international courts and tribunals, limited as they are, represent a judicial branch that is more robust than either those of an international legislative or international executive. Thus we must ask ourselves whether we turn to a court to accomplish a certain function because it is the best instrument to do so, or because we don't have the most appropriate tool to do so. Recall the hammer and the screwdriver.
Indeed, a number of courts are created not because they are the best tool, but rather they are created because there is not hammer, or the international community is unwilling to use the hammers it has. An example is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The creation of the Yugoslav Tribunal story has been told by several contemporary insiders as a decision that responded to the arguments of some to hold war criminals accountable, but that it in fact was precipitated by a desire to do somethinganything --given NATO's unwillingness to really do something such as commit forces. were not yet ready to commit troops . . ., but they felt the need to do something.")
To restate this preliminary point, the critical observation is that the role played by an international court may actually reflect the non-existence or the failure of an institution elsewhere. A further dramatic example well known to this audience is that private international arbitration is attractive not merely as an alternative to a court for reasons of speed or cost, but rather because in many cases there is no obvious court to be used. It may be that in a country such as Switzerland that domestic arbitration is chosen in lieu of the courts for reasons of speed, cost, or privacy. But in some developing countries, arbitration is chosen domestically by business as a way to run from corrupt or incompetent courts. In other words, the choice to create and use an international court may serve as a diagnostic lens on other portions of a system.
[3 rd Preliminary Point -The Political Motivation]
The example of the ICTFY leads to my third and final introductory point, namely that we need distinguish between the political motivation to create an international court or tribunal and the direct function it will play once it is created. Although the political motive might seem similar to the consequentialist function of a court, let it suffice to say for the moment that it is less directly connected.
The academic literature tends to assume that the decision to create IC&Ts is to be viewed in terms of a rational actor weighing how it might best resolve a conflict arising in regard to a particular treaty regime, issue area or particular relationship. The literature does this despite the fact that the historical accounts of the creation of an ICT often involves a much more complex set of causal forces. I do not argue that the literature is necessarily incorrect. Rather, I assert that in fact states decide often to create an international court or tribunal for reasons other than the function of resolving disputes.
For example, consider the string of decisions made to create international criminal tribunals in the last century. The assumption in much of the legal literature derived from the language of the constituent instruments is that the function of these institutions is twofold: (1) to hold war criminals accountable, and (2) to bring a measure of restorative justice. Yet these two functions often were only a part of the motives actually at play at the moment of creation. This is not to suggest that there are not some state actors or non state actors who sought accountability. Rather, it is to argue that a key force in each particular decision to take the route of creating an IC&T may have been something other than simple accountability.
Thus the story of the Nuremberg tribunal can be told as a decision prompted as an alternative to the views of some of the allies that the leadership of Nazi Germany should be summarily executed. 
[Functions in a World of Coexistence and Cooperation]
Let me turn now to the main thesis of my talk tonight, namely that there is underway a transition in roles for ICTs as the global politics and needs shift.
The first image I mentioned is one in which independent sovereign states seek to coexist (that is, there various billard balls do not hit one another creating chaos) and to cooperate (that these billard balls move in the same direction). This is the image mot familiar to us. ICTs by deciding disputes clarify the law and expectations between states, by deciding upon disputes they enable contracting, treaty-making, that would otherwise suffer from the inability to make credible promises, and to the extent that the decisions of these courts are viewed as correct and legitimate, it might allow the passion of national politics to be defused. In this image, states generally go about their own business, they need only not collide with one another and respect the promises they make to one to another. In this image, a claims commission is an institution meant to pick up the pieces of a collision between states.
In theory, there should not be that many inter state disputes. First, many disputes about cooperation can be worked out without going to an international court. Second, in a world with less 200 states, there are not that many parties.
What I would draw your attention to first --diagnostically -is that a significant portion of cases in international courts historically are not necessarily interstate, rather they are there because of failures elsewhere. A necessarily interstate dispute is one where the real parties in interest are states.
They are cases I would suggest that go to the very definition of the state -a case involving a foundational threat to the population or the territory of a state, a case regarding a customary or treaty based promise between states. Contrast with such disputes, cases based on espousal, where espousal is where a state claims that an unaddressed injury to one of its nationals is an injury to it. Many cases at the international level at the start of the 1900s involve espousal, the Mavromattis case in the PCIJ which involves a loss of a concession. Today that case in some countries might be addressed in national court, and more often would be addressed in international commercial arbitration. If it is the case that some disputes addressed at the interstate level primarily because of a failure at the national level or because international commercial arbitration was not yet fully in place, then it is also true that the growth of national courts that can be trusted and the availability of international commercial arbitration a an option has allowed a shift in dockets from the interstate to the national or private arbitral frameworks. This is one of the great successes of private international law over the past half century. And thank goodness this shift occurred because one thing we have learned is that the public international courts and tribunals can not handle volume.
Putting aside a mass claims institution like the UNCC, we see repeatedly the fact that the vision of international courts intended to resolve disputes between less than 200 possible parties is not appropriate when the possible parties are the people of a region or the business of the world. One of the first decisions for a prosecutor in an international criminal court is who will be pursued because it is clear that he or she can not go after everyone. Indeed the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone was limited to those most responsible for precisely this reason. This is the same realization that led Professor Wildhaber to seek to reshape the mission of the burdened European
Court of Human Rights from one where potentially every person of greater Europe may seek to have their rights protected to a court which instead oversees whether the national courts of each member state is systemically failing to protect such rights.
[Functions in Coordinated Governance and in Global Governance]
My suggestion to you tonight is that the first image of managing interstate relations is still there, it is still alive and well, but as my example of the European Court of Human Rights suggested it is not the only story any longer, indeed I would say it is not the key image any longer.
In my opinion, the present time is not merely another moment, but it is a point of inflection -a turn in the river -of human events, although whether that turn is managed well or poorly is of course up to all of us.
Clearly, we are in time where technological change continues, as it has for over a century, to give us -and the law --new challenges. The challenges are new, but that pattern is a continuing one. Also, since the end of the Cold War, the illusory concreteness of East and West has been replaced by a more complex and diverse world that is, once again, more regional and where differences are to be appreciated. But --I would like to focus our attention on a different historical strand that is shaping the challenges we have before us and therefore the roles that are given to ICTs
The shift in our time I wish to emphasize runs in the opposite direction to appreciation for diversity, namely we find ourselves more complexly tied to one another than ever before. Financial crises spread like viruses. The environment demands that we -the world as a whole -pay attention.
Terrorism slips through the interstices of our modern world periodically making mockery of a normalcy we seek to recall. In this sense, although global governance once was concerned with international order solely in the sense of interactions between states as though they existed separately, today global governance also is concerned with governance of a complexly interactive interdependent world which happens to be divided politically and where much of the task of governing therefore is necessarily -and appropriately to be done by national governments. Global governance today therefore seeks agreement on the objectives and polices of national government. And even as such important matters are entrusted to the states, global governance recognizes that a few states will not be good partners and that quite a few states perhaps do not possess the capacity to carry out the tasks given them. Thus we see global governance today also seeking to ensure that national governments possess the capacity, meaning that they possess a rule of law and regulatory machinery necessary.
Let us think diagnostically again, if we had a world of sovereign states all with robust internal rule of law (by which I mean that they would be viewed as possessing systems of independent and impartial tribunals that each state could mutually respect), one can imagine a world of courts where - (1) The absence of robust national rule of law means that there will be disputes in ICTs that are not necessarily at that level, espousal cases are one category mentioned already. But investment claims are another. The substance of the investment claim may reflect a breakdown in rule of law in the state involved, and likewise the capacity of the investor to invoke international arbitration under bilateral investment treaties without even exhaustion of remedies reflects a deep distrust of host country courts in at least some countries.
Conclusion
Thomas Holland, a British scholar of jurisprudence once wrote that international law "is the vanishing point of jurisprudence." 12 When I first read the quote in isolation, I took it as a critique of the reality of international law as law. But when read in full, he actually says two things. One point anticipates Lauterpacht: it is weakened by the lack "any arbiter of disputed questions." But his other and main point is something quite different. His main point is that it is ironic that when and if international law succeeds in its task, it will "be not the triumph, but the extinction of International law, which can subsist only between States . . ." I agree with the first point, but not the second.
More likely than global government is global governance where states remain the key actor, but an actor who governs responsibly under law, carrying out the jointly conceived policies of the international community, policies that will preserve human dignity, that will make our economies more resilient, that will allow our world to be sustainable and that grants us freedom from fear. I have suggested a world of courts what would look like then. It is a world where the role of international courts and tribunals does not vanish but rather matures. It is an image where international courts are not envisioned as in opposition to national courts, but rather as working with national courts. To manage this transition is our challenge. We are only a part of the way there, to go further we must encourage the capacity for governance and rule of law generally, incrementally expanding the zone of rule of law in the world. For international law and its courts to succeed, it and they will in time need to let go -a little bit.
